




Little doubt remains that agricultural
operations will be increasingly constrained by
environmental regulations. In that spirit, each of the
foregoing authors has provided a general framework
for a specific environmental issue as it impacts
agriculturalists. I learned something from each
paper (an important criterion). Rather than
summarize the points made by the authors, I have
chosen to address each paper separately and point
out some specific issues which I feel were
overlooked in the papers or which seem to follow
directly from the discussions in the papers.
Three specific issues are raised by Osteen’s
presentation of the regulatory environment for
pesticides. The first arises from his discussion of
decision criteria used in pesticide registration
decisions. Osteen suggests that a risk-benefit
criterion, whereby the risks ansing from a
pesticide’s use are evaluated along with benefits
associated with the pesticide’s use, is preferable to
a risk-only criterion, which takes no account of
pesticide use benefits. He then reviews results of
some pesticide benefit analyses to demonstrate the
value of specific pesticides in several crop
production enterprises. Most pesticide benefit
anaiyses are conducted using a partial budgeting
approach: pesticide benefits are equal to the value
of production lost plus the change in pest control
costs incurred when pesticide choices are limited
(USGAO, 1991).
The National Agricultural Pesticide Impact
Assessment Program (NAPIAP) was established to
aid EPA in conducting pesticide benefit studies --
specifically to evaluate the farm/rural benefits of
pesticide use (USGAO, 1989). However, the value
of NAPIAP information in EPA’s decisions has
been questioned (USGAO, 1989); that pesticide use
data are scarce, that studies of pesticide impacts are
of limited duration, and that analyses rely heavily
on estimates provided by experts rather than
research-generated data are specific concerns. I
would caution that these NAPIAP studies provide at
best only a limited basis for a full accounting of
benefits to be used in regulatory decisions. There
have been other, broader studies which have
assessed economic impacts on both producers and
consumers of banning specific pesticides but they
have not been without their critics (Knutson et al.;
Ayer and Conklin). The bottom line: if the risk-
benefit criterion is to be used, the estimation of
benefits must be defendable.
Second, Osteen uses the term “economic
loss” to refer to situations where banning of
pesticides takes away the benefits referred to above.
Bromley has called this the “language of loss” and
cautions that in regulatory debates such language
distorts the choices faced. Specifically, it relies on
the assumption that the status quo is the appropriate
basis from which to compare policy choices. In
fact, the benefits of pesticide use that are labeled
“losses” in the regulatory debate have come at some
external cost. The critical question is really: Who
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is expected to bear the costs of a particular
decision? As Schmid has pointed out, “Costs do
not simply exist in nature but are selected by the
public choice of property rights (p. 241).”
It is possible that the set of rights that
protects pesticide users from bearing unwanted
economic costs is preferred, although this is less and
less obvious. However, it is incumbent upon
economists who engage in policy analysis to clarify
such a position and explicitly express the acceptance
of the status quo as the appropriate base for
analysis, To recognize its limitations is also a
requirement,
Third, Osteen makes a valuable point in his
attention to the potential for increasing pesticide
risks when one pesticide is removed from use
without consideration of the potential risks
associated with compounds which are likely to be
substituted for the lost pesticide. And this risk is
not limited to risks of pesticide residues in food. A
complex array of issues faces those charged with
assessing risks associated with pesticide use. Food
safety, worker protection, water quality, risks to
wildlife, and air quality are prominent. Because the
number of agencies and individuals charged with
evaluating risks and developing management
strategies is so large, and because the regulations
controlling them differ in their approaches (as
Osteen has noted), there is ample opportunity for
inconsistency. There is a critical need for a
coordinated, comprehensive approach to evaluating
pesticide risk; a pesticide policy which, as an
example, reduces risks of pesticide residues in food
while increasing water quality risks can only be
improved.
In his paper on coordinating government
programs aimed at achieving agricultural
sustainability, Johnson suggests that, again, a
comprehensive approach to addressing natural
resource and environmental issues is needed. He
provides a specific example of attempts to
coordinate water quality programs in the Tennessee
Valley. He also notes that results have been mixed.
I would have been interested in his views on how
coordination of program implementation could be
enhanced, especially when a greater array of issues
is to be addressed. This is especially important now
that a move is afoot to encourage the adoption by
farmers of whole-farm resource management plans.
So far, the suggestion -- in pending
legislation (HR1440) and offered by the Soil
Conservation Service (Bridge) -- is that SCS
implement such a program, both by developing
resource management plans and by coordinating
various state and federal agencies whose expertise
might be required in the planning process. I have
two specific concerns about the proposal. First, it
is not clear that SCS has or can expect to have the
resources, both financial and human, to implement
the proposed program. Second, the institutional and
organizational constraints to such a program are
problematic. Several states are in the process of
implementing Total Resource Management
programs. The states which have developed
implementation plans so far have based those plans
on the existing institutional and agency structure
within which the planning and implementation
would take place. Because these structures vary
widely, other states should not be expected to adopt,
wholesale, the models developed by these pilot
states.
Johnson also suggests that responsibility for
providing the financial and informational base for
achieving agricultural sustainability will fall to
society at large. This is not likely to be a
unanimously held position. In their recent report
“Soil and Water Quality: An Agenda for
Agriculture”, Batie and colleagues (National
Research Council, Committee on Long-Range Soil
and Water Conservation) note that agricultural
landowners have enjoyed a wide range of rights
with respect to the way farming is done. But they
also note how those rights, and as a result, the
responsibilities of farmers are changing. The
Committee recommends that the rights and
responsibilities of agricultural landowners and
farmers be clarified by state and federal rules. The
role that society will choose for itself, in light of
changing views of the responsibilities of agriculture,
may well differ from the one suggested by Johnson.
Finally, I turn to Carriker’s paper on
wetland regulations. His paper reflects an
impressive attention to the more recent literature on
debates over wetland regulations and the attention to
wetland issues in the court system. Perhaps
purposefully, he has avoided any reference to issues
associated with the Swampbuster provisions of the
1985 and 1990 farm laws. In some sense that is too
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Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and the
potential inconsistencies in implementation make for
some interesting debates, especially as they relate to
agricultural land. In addition, there are a number of
interesting issues -- some economic, some political -
- relating to the protection of wetlands which he did
not address. Let me suggest a few.
One of the most critical problems facing
agricultural landowners has been the lack of
consistency in terms of wetland delineation between
SCS for Swampbuster and the Corps of Engineers
for section 404. An area delineated as a wetland by
the Corps might not be so delineated by SCS. So
it is possible to violate section 404 without violating
swampbuster. The reverse situation is also possible.
Recent actions resulting from the Clinton
administration’s Interagency Working Group on
Federal Wetlands Policy (Office of Environmental
Policy) are aimed at improving this situation. A
Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Wetlands
Determinations on Agricultural Lands was published
in the January 19, 1994 Federal Register. The basic
agreement is that SCS will do wetland delineations
for agricultural lands and the Corps and other
agencies will use those delineations in their
jurisdictional activities.
Agricultural lands are defined in the MOA
as those lands intensively used and managed for the
production of food or fiber to the extent that the
natural vegetation has been removed and cannot be
used to determine whether the area meets applicable
hydrophytic vegetation criteria in making a wetland
delineation. Agricultural lands do not include range
lands, forest lands, wood lots, or tree farms, lands
where the natural vegetation has not been removed,
even though that vegetation may be regularly
grazed or mowed and collected as forage or fodder.
(I suspect some farmers and ranchers would
disagree.) The MOA does allow that for lands
owned or operated by a USDA program participant
that are not agricultural lands and for which the
participant requests a delineation, SCS will do the
delineation in coordination with the Corps or EPA
as appropriate and in consultation with the US Fish
and Wildlife Service. Has the delineation question
been settled? I don’t think so. And even if it has,
there is sufficient inconsistency in the way the two
laws are written that it is still possible to violate one
and not the other, So landowners are still without
a clear direction with respect to their responsibilities
for managing wetlands.
A second area in which coordination and
consistency problems are critical is with respect to
the impact on overall credibility of government
efforts to protect wetlands. We’ve seen the problem
of inconsistencies between soil conservation
programs and commodity programs addressed with
the Sodbuster and Conservation Compliance
programs. But remaining inconsistencies threaten
the credibility of public efforts. I would introduce
you to a rancher in Oklahoma who, as a participant
in the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s Partners for
Wildlife Program, has enhanced the wetlands on his
property and has constructed new wetlands. The
Partners for Wildlife program is one which
combines federal, state and private financial support
for wetland protection on private lands. This
individual has received considerable financial input
from various state and federal sources and has
invested heavily of his own resources. Now, he is
facing the condemnation of a portion of his property
because of the proposed construction of a new
highway. And a large portion of the land targeted
for condemnation contains his wetlands. Most
likely, the total costs of that highway construction
project have not been calculated.
Wetland valuation is a problematic issu~
its resolution has particular importance with respect
to discussions of mitigation and wetland
classification. There is considerable effort
underway to measure the functional value of
wetlands -- their value as sponges of flood waters,
purifiers of contaminated water, and habitat for
wildlife. In addition, resource economists are
amassing a rich literature of studies using
nonmarket valuation techniques to assess the value
of wetlands, (Luzar and Gan have provided a
recent review of technical and economics literature
on wetland functions and values). There has even
been some discussion in the policy arena of
categorizing wetlands based on their value and
implementing protection programs accordingly.
However, the problem goes beyond one of
definition. The value of a wetland is not fixed in
time or space. As Shabman and colleagues have
pointed out, “a preserved wetland site might at some
point in the future have its functional contribution to
the watershed diminished by human alterations toJ. Agr. and Applied Econ., July, 1994
the surrounding landscape and hydrologic regime (p.
42).” Any categorization of wetlands based on
value must “simultaneously consider the ecological,
economic and political aspects of wetlands
regulation (Shabman et al., p, 42).”
Last year’s flood in the midwest provides
for an interesting laboratory in which the public’s
commitment to wetland protection can be tested,
The irony is that publicly financed drainage, dikes
and levees across the northern plains and the
midwest have exacerbated flood damages (Denning).
Now, considerable federal funding has been
appropriated for rebuilding of levees and
reappropriation of flooded cropland (U.S. Congress),
although plans for implementation have not been
announced. Whether that funding might be better
spent in an effort to restore wetlands in the region
to ameliorate possible future flooding seems an
obvious question. Around $15 million have been
appropriated for expanding the federal Wetlands
Reserve Program in that area (Federal Register,
1993). It is not often that such a significant
opportunity for meeting environmental goals
presents itself. Whether it is acted upon will, in my
opinion, speak to the relative importance placed on
wetlands and their roles in that vital ecosystem.
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Perhaps the most interesting and most
difficult question with respect to wetland protection
on private lands is who should pay to assure
wetlands are protected? For that matter, who should
pay to assure the protection of endangered species
habitat on private land? Or for any other “special
place”, as Zinn has called them, which is found on
private land? Clearly, responsibility for protection
of these special places depends on where the rights
to those areas are vested. As noted earlier,
agricultural landowners have enjoyed a wide range
of rights, and these rights have provided the basis
for past environmental policy. However, those
rights are clearly changing as we find landowners
being asked to bear the costs of protecting these
vital resources. The question of compensation is
critical, and it goes beyond the legal recognition of
compensation for taking of property. If these
special places are of value to society, is there a
responsibility on the part of society to share the cost
of protecting them? We saw farmland protection
programs in the 1980s evolve as a shared effort to
preserve prime farmland and open space. Certainly,
the Wetlands Reserve Program is one example of
such a shared effort on behalf of wetlands. But
with its limited scope, that program alone cannot be
expected to address the problems which arise when
private landowners are asked to bear the costs
associated with assuring a public good.
References
Ayer, H. and N. Conklin. “Economics of Ag Chemicals: Flawed Methodology and a Conflict of
Interest Quagmire,” CHOICES. (Fourth Quarter, 1990):24-30.
Bridge, G. “Is Whole-farm Conservation Planning the Answer?” J. Soil and Water Cons.
48(1993):295-298.
Bromley, D,W. “Balancing Policy for Environment and Economic Development.” lrzcreasing
Understanding of Public Problems and Policies -1991. Farm Foundation, Oak Brook, IL, 1992.
Carriker, R.R. “Wetlands and Environmental Legislation Issues.” Journal of Agricultural and Applied
Economics. (July 1994):80-89.
Denning, J. “When the Levee Breaks.” Civil Engineering. (January 1994):38-41.
Federal Register, Vol. 58, p. 63495, November 29, 1993.
Federal Register, Vol 59, p. 2920, January 19, 1994.94 Norr[s: Environmental Regulations as Constraints to Agriculture: A Discussion
Johnson, L.A. “Sustainability Issues: How Should Government Coordinate Farm Regulations and
Policy?” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics. (July 1994):75-79.
Knutson, R,D., C.R. Taylor, J,B. Penson and E.G. Smith, Economic Impacts of Reduced Chemical
Use. Knutson and Associates, College Station, TX, 1990.
Luzar, E.J. and C. Gan. “Economic Valuation of Wetland Functions and Values: Literature Review 1985-
1991.” Contract No. DACW39-9 l-M-2765, Wetlands Research Program of the Environmental
Laboratory, U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station, 1991.
National Research Council, Committee on Long-Range Soil and Water Conservation. Soil and
Water Quality: An Agenda for Agriculture. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1993.
Osteen, C. “Pesticide Regulation Issues: Living with the Delaney Clause.” Journal of Agricultural and
Applied Economics. (July 1994):60-74.
Office of Environmental Policy. “Protecting America’s Wetlands: A Fair, Flexible, and Effective
Approach.” Washington, D.C., 1993.
Schmid, A.A. Property, Power and Public Choice: An Inquiry into Law and Economics. Praeger
Publishers, New York, 1978.
Shabman, L., D. King and P. Scodari. “Making Wetlands Mitigation Work: The Credit Market
Alternative.” SP-93-5, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Virginia Tech,
Blacksburg, VA, 1993.
U.S. Congress. P,L, 103-75. 1993.
United States General Accounting Office. Pesticides: Economic Research Service’s Analyses of
Proposed EPA Actions. GAO/RCED-89-75BR, Washington, D.C., 1989.
United States General Accounting Office. Pesticides: EPA’s Use of Benefit Assessments in Regulating
Pesticides, GAO/RCED-91-52, Washington, D.C., 1991.
Zinn, J. Comments at Berg Fellowship Forum, Soil and Water Conservation Society, Washington
D,C., 1993.